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UNWRITTEN RULES AND THE NEW
CONTRACT PARADIGM
David Skeel*
The emergence of large-scale corporate reorganization in the second half of
the nineteenth century was the single most remarkable achievement of the
common law in America. When a large railroad failed, as they often did,
everyone wanted it to be reorganized. 1 All of the stakeholders would be worse
off if the railroad was liquidated, even the senior creditors, since a mortgage on,
say, a hundred miles of railroad track in the middle of nowhere was worth little
if the railroad was shut down. The public interest also cried out for
reorganization, given the growing nation’s need for an effective system of
transportation. Unfortunately, serious constitutional obstacles made it difficult
for either Congress or the states to intervene. The courts filled the gap by giving
their imprimatur to a remarkable innovation that became known as equity or
railroad receivership. Creditors asked for a receiver and pretended to foreclose
on the railroad’s assets, but the parties actually reorganized the railroad through
a “sale” that effected a restructuring of its obligations.
In the standard historical account, corporate reorganization evolved from
this cobbled together, fast-and-loose process to a more formal, structured
judicial proceeding. After decades of equity receivership practice, the story goes,
Congress finally codified large scale corporate reorganization in the early
1930s. 2 Congress adopted sweeping reforms in 1938 and again in 1978, when
current chapter 11 was put in place. 3 We now have an elaborate statute
governing the reorganization of large troubled corporations.
In this Essay and the larger book from which it comes, Douglas Baird
contends that the standard account misses an essential feature of corporate
reorganization practice. 4 Corporate reorganization continues to take place
through negotiations between the debtor and its creditors, just as it did over a
*
S. Samuel Arsht Professor of Corporate Law, University of Pennsylvania. Thanks to Douglas Baird,
Sarah Borders, Richard Levin, and Bruce Markell for helpful comments and conversation, and to the editors of
the Emory Bankruptcy Developments Journal for including me in this fine symposium.
1
With apologies for immediately succumbing to the commenter’s temptation to veer into self-reference,
the events in this paragraph are described in detail in DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT’S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF
BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA (2001).
2
Id. at 16.
3
Id. at 19.
4
Douglas G. Baird, The Fraudulent Conveyance Origins of Chapter 11: An Essay on the Unwritten Law
of Corporate Reorganizations, 36 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 693 (2020); DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, THE UNWRITTEN
LAW OF CORPORATE REORGANIZATIONS (unpublished manuscript, 2020).
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century ago. These negotiations are governed by unwritten rules that “are wellknown to insiders, but largely invisible to those on the outside.” 5 The parties are
expected to provide full disclosure, and to give robust participation rights to
every affected party. Senior creditors can use modest payoffs to quiet potential
objectors, but “other sorts of side deals are out of bounds.” 6 The role of the judge
is to serve as a vigilant referee, intervening if one of the players violates these
unwritten rules. 7
According to Professor Baird, the unwritten rules date back to the
prohibition of actions that “hinder, delay, or defraud” in the statute of 13
Elizabeth nearly five hundred years ago. 8 Some of the unwritten rules, such as
the insistence on full disclosure, have remained constant through time. In other
respects, they have evolved. The unwritten rules, not bankruptcy’s distribution
rules or other features of the Bankruptcy Code (Code), are the essence of
corporate reorganization. My colleague Charles Mooney once insisted that
bankruptcy law is simply Civil Procedure. 9 For Professor Baird, bankruptcy’s
essence is fraudulent conveyance.
Professor Baird’s story is highly persuasive, in my view, and captures a key
dimension of bankruptcy practice that has not been fully appreciated. Even when
Professor Baird is covering familiar ground, such as the emergence of equity
receivership, he supplies new and interesting insights. Writing about early
railroad receivership cases in which creditors of a subsidiary were given no
recovery, for instance, Professor Baird discerns a logic to their exclusion: “the
only ones given a seat at the bargaining table were those stakeholders who were
to be part of the business going forward.” 10 “[T]hose who had invested in the
assets of the railroad that were to stay with the business” needed to be included,
and to be given a recovery. 11 Others did not.
The story covers a great deal of ground very quickly, and as a result
Baird, Origins, supra note 4, at 693.
Id.
7
“Rather than a dispenser of Solomonic wisdom, the bankruptcy judge is like a referee. A good referee
ensures that the rules of the game are followed.” Id. It is heartening that Professor Baird can unselfconsciously
describe bankruptcy judges as “referees.” Even a decade or two ago, the memory of the inferior status of
“bankruptcy referees” under the old Bankruptcy Act was still fresh, and scholars would have avoided the referee
metaphor.
8
Id. at 693. In his comments on Professor Baird’s essay, Professor Markell argues for much earlier
origins. Bruce A. Markell, Lawyers, Judges and Unwritten Rules, 36 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 713 (2020).
9
Charles Mooney, A Normative Theory of Bankruptcy Law: Bankruptcy as (is) Civil Procedure, 61
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 931 (2004).
10
Baird, Origins, supra note 4, at 700.
11
Id.
5
6
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oversimplifies at times. The historical evolution also is bumpier than Professor
Baird suggests. Rather than simply introducing more vigilant judicial oversight
of the restructuring process, 12 for instance, the New Deal reformers seem to me
to have sought and temporarily achieved a sharp break from prior practice. But
the persistence of a handful of evolving implicit principles over many
generations is remarkable, and quite revealing of how large-scale corporate
reorganization actually works. 13 This project is the crowning achievement (so
far, at least!) of the most important bankruptcy scholar of our time.
In the discussion that follows, I make two simple points. In the first part, I
argue that what’s good for bankruptcy insiders is not always good for everyone;
in the second and third, that bankruptcy’s written rules—by which I mean both
statutory provisions and the parties’ contracts—still matter, and they matter a
lot.
I.

THE DANGERS OF UNWRITTEN RULES

Professor Baird tells a (mostly) happy story about insolvency lawyers
devising pragmatic solutions to financial distress under the benign but alert eye
of judges who leave the parties to their own devices so long as they honor the
unwritten rules. Although Professor Baird does not fully delineate them—
perhaps because doing so would lift the lid on their mystery—the unwritten rules
seem to include an expectation of full disclosure, a commitment to ensuring that
everyone gets to participate, and an acceptance of “tips” but not bribes.
The foil in Professor Baird’s story is bankruptcy’s distributional rules,
especially the absolute priority rule. The absolute priority rule is extolled by
many as the essence of corporate reorganization. This view is mistaken in two
respects, in Professor Baird’s view. Not only does the conventional wisdom
exaggerate the import of the distributional rules, but absolute priority is not even
the best baseline. The first of these contentions is central here, and the second is
developed in detail in Professor Baird’s other work. 14
12
“The judge had to apply the principles of the Statute of 13 Eliz. c. 5 more aggressively, insist on full
disclosure, and be quick to act if the potential for advantage-taking arose.” Id. at 705.
13
Or, we might say, how reorganization and sales work. With respect to current chapter 11 cases,
Professor Baird’s discussion often seems more relevant to filings that lead to bankruptcy sales than to traditional
reorganizations.
14
Professor Baird’s doubts about absolute priority seem to have emerged in articles such as Douglas G.
Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Control Rights, Priority Rights and the Conceptual Foundations of Corporate
Reorganizations, 87 VA. L. REV. 921 (2001). His work has spawned a major debate on the priority question.
Compare Douglas G. Baird, Priority Matters: Absolute Priority, Relative Priority, and the Costs of Bankruptcy,
165 U. PA. L. REV. 785 (2017); Anthony J. Casey, The Creditors’ Bargain and Option Preservation: Priority in
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While bankruptcy’s unwritten rules are attractive in many respects, it is
important to acknowledge the potential dangers of a non-transparent, insider-run
system. In the early decades of the last century, the New Deal reformers thought
that insiders’ temptation to favor their own interests poisoned the entire
reorganization process. 15 William Douglas famously condemned the
“degeneration of the bar” in many reorganizations, and complained that
“[c]onflicts of interest have had their corroding influence.” 16 The voluminous
report produced by the Securities and Exchange Commission under Douglas’s
guidance in the late 1930s repeatedly condemned the reorganization insiders
who operated according to their own unwritten rules. 17
The New Dealers’ complaints were seasoned with hyperbole, in my view,
but the temptation for insiders to favor their own interests, whether consciously
or unconsciously, is real. The most obvious example is the fees charged by
lawyers and bankers in large cases. 18 Because the leading players are repeat
players, and will continue to work with one another in future cases, they have
little incentive to police one another’s compensation. 19 The principal current
corrective in recent cases has been to appoint a fee examiner, 20 but even the most
savvy fee examiner is only a limited substitute for policing by the parties who
are most intimately involved in the case.
Chapter 11; 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 759 (2011); Anthony J. Casey & Edward R. Morrison, Beyond Options (working
paper); with Barry A. Adler and George Triantis, Debt Priority and Options in Bankruptcy: A Policy
Intervention, 91 AM. BANKR. L.J. 563, 583 (2017) (defending absolute priority).
15
Although my focus here is on large scale reorganization, bankruptcy cases involving smaller firms
were thought to be controlled by “bankruptcy rings” for much of the twentieth century. A principal objective of
the 1978 Code was to curb these abuses.
16
WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE 233 (James Allen ed., 1940).
17
“Managements and bankers seek perpetuation of [their] control for the business patronage it commands
. . . .” the initial volume of the report contended. I SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION REPORT ON THE
STUDY AND INVESTIGATION OF THE WORK, ACTIVITIES, PERSONNEL, AND FUNCTIONS OF PROTECTIVE AND
REORGANIZATION COMMITTEES 863 (1937). Reorganization lawyers were no better: “The vice of the bar is that
the bar has been charging all that the traffic will bear.” Id. at 867.
18
Whether the fees are excessive is the subject of a longstanding debate. Compare LYNN M. LOPUCKI &
JOSEPH DOHERTY, PROFESSIONAL FEES IN CORPORATE BANKRUPTCIES: DATES, ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION
(2011) (contending that professional fees are excessive), with Stephen J. Lubben, Corporate Reorganization &
Professional Fees, 82 AM. BANKR. L.J. 77 (2008) (more sanguine view of fees). Either way, they are enormous
in many big cases, see Katy Stech Ferek, Fed Says Lehman Brothers Chapter 11 Case is Costliest in History,
WALL ST. J. (Jan. 16, 2019) (discussing Federal Reserve projection that the fees and expenses in the Lehman
Brothers bankruptcy will reach nearly $6 billion).
19
Fee examiners mitigate this problem to some extent, but imperfectly. See, e.g., Stephen J. Lubben,
What We “Know” About Chapter 11 Cost is Wrong, 17 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 1 (2012).
20
Another of the commentators on Professor Baird’s essay, Professor Markell, is the fee examiner in the
PG&E bankruptcy. See, e.g., Alex Wolf, PG&E Professionals, Examiner at Odds Over Non-Work Travel Fees,
BLOOMBERG LAW (Oct. 25, 2019), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/bankruptcy-law/pg-e-professionalsexaminer-at-odds-over-non-work-travel-fees.
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A more subtle version of the temptation to favor insiders is the tendency of
bankruptcy professionals, and even bankruptcy judges, to privilege bankruptcy
over alternative forums for resolving financial distress. This bias is one possible
explanation for bankruptcy judges’ more favorable response to restructuring
support agreements (RSAs) and other contracts entered into during bankruptcy,
than to intercreditor agreements that predate the bankruptcy filing. RSAs are
drafted by bankruptcy professionals and increase the likelihood of a successful
reorganization; intercreditor agreements are not and often do not. 21 To be sure,
the preference for bankruptcy is not always undesirable. For instance, contracts
made before bankruptcy sometimes have problematic features. However,
bankruptcy courts appear to be excessively hostile to prebankruptcy contracts. 22
A process that depends on negotiations among insiders also may also
produce significantly suboptimal results. Professor Baird notes that “[w]hile
there [are] many possible deals” in this environment, “the players naturally
gravitate[] toward only a few”—a limited number of “focal points.” 23 This can
be beneficial if the focal points are likely to effectively resolve the debtor’s
financial distress. But what if the focal points are more problematic? If the focal
points are major creditors’ current claims, for instance, the restructuring may not
be sufficiently robust, and the debtor may still have too much debt when it
emerges from bankruptcy. This may have been a problem with railroad
reorganizations a century ago, 24 and it could still be a problem in large-scale
corporate reorganizations today. 25
I do not think the dark sides of a process governed by unwritten rules are so
dire that bankruptcy law needs to be completely upended. But I do think it is
important to look for opportunities to diminish the distortions that attend a
system run by insiders. 26
21
Bankruptcy insiders also can be expected to lobby for expansions of bankruptcy, and to resist other
incursions on their territory, such as efforts by the parties to waive bankruptcy.
22
See, e.g., Kenneth Ayotte, Anthony J. Casey, & David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy on the Side, 112 NW.
U. L. REV. 255, 257–58 (2017) (criticizing courts’ use of a “clear beyond peradventure” standard in policing
intercreditor agreements).
23
Baird, Origins, supra note 5, at 710 n.83. (citing THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT
57–58 (1960)).
24
See Stephen Lubben, Railroad Receiverships and Modern Bankruptcy Theory, 89 CORNELL L. REV.
1420, 1449 (2004).
25
Mark Roe made this argument decades ago. See Mark J. Roe, Bankruptcy and Debt: A New Model for
Corporate Reorganization, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 527 (1983).
26
In response to somewhat analogous concerns in corporate law—plaintiffs’ lawyers challenges to nearly
every large proposed merger—Delaware has cracked down on disclosure-only settlements. See In re Trulia, Inc.
Stockholder Litigation, 129 A.3d 884, 898–99 (Del. Ch. 2016) (requiring proponents of a disclosure-only
settlement to show the disclosures are “plainly material”).
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II. THE WRITTEN RULES MATTER
The great insight of Professor Baird’s essay is demonstrating just how much
a simple set of unwritten principles matter, and tracing them back to early
fraudulent conveyance law. These principles are indeed central—much more
central than anyone realized before Professor Baird’s work-- but it is important
to recognize just how much the written rules still matter. 27
Fraudulent conveyance law itself nicely makes this point. Professor Baird
focuses on the early emergence of fraudulent conveyance law, which prohibited
intentional misbehavior by debtors and came to rely on a loose set of “badges of
fraud.” 28 In its traditional garb, fraudulent conveyance law depends more on
standards than on rules. But it has become increasingly rules oriented, thanks to
the widespread adoption of “constructive fraud” statutes in the early twentieth
century. If an insolvent debtor transfers property for less than reasonably
equivalent consideration, the transfer can be avoided. 29 Although “constructive
fraud” is something of an oxymoron, as Charles Tabb has aptly pointed out, 30 it
now figures far prominently than the traditional, “actual” fraud provisions, in no
small part because it is rule-oriented and easy to apply. 31 To be sure, discretion
comes into play at times even with constructive fraud, but its use is rarely
determined by the “unwritten rules.”
Bankruptcy’s distributional rules also seem more consequential than
Professor Baird’s story allows. Under the flexible version of absolute priority in
current law, the rules serve as a backstop to the parties’ efforts to negotiate a
restructuring. A class of creditors can agree to treatment that violates the
absolute priority rule. 32 If the class votes no, however, the proposed plan cannot
be confirmed if it deviates from the absolute priority rule with respect to that
class. 33
27
Richard Levin also emphasizes the importance of the written rules in his commentary—an especially
appropriate perspective given that he was one of the principal drafters of the Bankruptcy Code. Richard Levin,
A Response to Professor Baird’s Essay on Unwritten Law, 36 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 723 (2020).
28
“Twyne’s Case held that, in addition to transactions involving actual fraud, the Statute of 13 Eliz.
empowered the court to strike down any transactions that had ‘badges of fraud.’” Baird, Origins, supra note 4,
at 694.
29
Professor Baird hints at this feature of modern fraudulent conveyance law, but it does not figure in the
unwritten rules. Id.
30
CHARLES JORDAN TABB, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY 591–92 (2d ed. 2009).
31
Preference law is now similarly rule-oriented, as Professor Baird notes. Baird, Origins, supra note 5,
at 696 n.21 (citing Robert Weisberg, Commercial Morality, the Merchant Character, and the History of Voidable
Preference, 39 STAN. L. REV. 3, 4–5 (1986)).
32
See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(8) (2019).
33
See § 1129(b).
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Professor Baird does acknowledge that the distributional rules perform a
useful function by forcing the debtor to give every major class a seat at the
bargaining table. Professor Baird suggests that this, rather than the rules
themselves, is the principal contribution of priority. “Protecting the bargaining
environment rather than ensuring proper division of the assets is the task at
hand[,]” he writes. 34 “Ensuring that distributional rules are followed is necessary
to do this and hence a necessary part of ensuring that the players follow the rules
of the game, but it is hardly the only part.” 35
The seat-at-the-table benefit of the priority rules does seem essential, but the
priority rules strike me as doing more than this alone. In my view, the absolute
priority rule provides an essential baseline for the bankruptcy process. 36 One of
the difficulties of the unwritten rule that modest payments to potential dissenters
are okay but side payments and bribes are not is that it is extraordinarily difficult
to tell which is which. In its much-discussed Jevic decision, the Supreme Court,
perhaps in part for this reason, adopted a per se prohibition against payments
that bypass a higher priority class in the context of a so-called structured
dismissal. 37 The absolute priority rule does not just force the debtor and senior
creditors to permit the intervening party to participate; it prohibits them from
implementing a plan—no matter how compelling the plan may seem—that does
not honor the intervening party’s priority rights.
One context where the unwritten tip-versus-bribe rule does still operate is
when a senior creditor that may have a claim to all of the debtor’s assets purports
to redirect some of its recovery to a lower priority class. In an asset sale, this
takes the form of a “tip” to the creditors committee. In a traditional
reorganization, it takes the form of a “gift” from senior creditors to one class of
lower priority class of claims but not others. Whereas courts have often allowed
tips in the sale context, with traditional reorganizations, the principal focus of
Professor Baird’s essay, courts (especially appellate courts) have been quite
hostile, often insisting on adherence to bankruptcy’s written rules. 38 It is possible
that one reason tips are more prevalent than gifts is that it is nearly impossible
for an objecting creditor to challenge an asset sale that has been negotiated by
insiders and approved by the bankruptcy judge, due to a strong statutory
Baird, Origins, supra note 4, at 709.
Id.
36
It is also worth noting that the choice of priority rule can significantly affect the parties’ incentives and
the bargaining dynamics.
37
See Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973, 986–87 (2017).
38
See, e.g., Dish Network Corp. v. DBSB N. Am., Inc. (In re DBSD N. Am., Inc.), 634 F.3d 79, 98, 100
(2d Cir. 2011); In re Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 432 F.3d 507, 512–13 (3d Cir. 2005).
34
35
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presumption that sales will not be undone. 39 This may be a context where the
written rules have the ironic effect of protecting decisions made in accordance
with the unwritten rules. 40
III. THE NEW CONTRACT PARADIGM
The place where Professor Baird’s emphasis on unwritten rules and the
continuing importance of written rules most fully come together is contract. The
most dramatic development in recent reorganization practice is the extent to
which reorganization cases are now shaped by pre-bankruptcy (ex-ante)
contracts, and by contracts negotiated during the bankruptcy case (ex-post).
Elsewhere, George Triantis and I have called this the new “contract paradigm.” 41
Contracts have always been central to large scale reorganization, of course.
In a railroad receivership, investors “deposited” their securities with the
committee negotiating on their behalf pursuant to a contract, and the committees
joined together to form a reorganization committee pursuant to another
contract. 42 But the scope of contract has dramatically expanded with respect to
both prebankruptcy contracting and contracting during the bankruptcy case.
Start with prebankruptcy contracting. Financial contracting is far more
sophisticated today than in earlier generations, which has dramatically expanded
the range of potential prebankruptcy contracts. It is now possible to divvy up
cash flows in ways that would have been unimaginable in the past, and to
allocate responsibility in the event of financial distress. The new contracts
include intercreditor agreements and unitranche arrangements, in addition to
more traditional loan syndicates. 43
39
See 11 U.S.C. § 363(m) (2019) (good faith sale cannot be reversed unless it is stayed pending appeal).
It also is difficult to appeal bankruptcy judges’ orders confirming a reorganization plan, due to equitable
mootness doctrine. But equitable mootness is not as complete a barrier to challenge as § 363(m).
40
There is a more general point here as well: the unwritten rules benefit from the difficulty of appealing
decisions made at the bankruptcy court level. If existing constraints on appeal such as equitable mootness
doctrine are relaxed, the unwritten rules could have less sway, at least on the margins. For criticism of current
equitable mootness doctrine, see Bruce Markell, The Needs of the Many: Equitable Mootness’ Pernicious
Effects, 93 AM. BANKR. L.J. 377 (2019).
41
David A. Skeel & George Triantis, Bankruptcy’s Uneasy Shift to a Contract Paradigm, 166 U. PA. L.
REV. 1777, 1780 (2018).
42
“Various committees, generally organized by the management or underwriters of the securities, sprang
up,” as one mid-twentieth century commentator put it. “These committees without court supervision drew their
own deposit agreements, solicited the deposit of securities and formulated plans of reorganization by negotiation
and agreement among the various classes of security holders.” Arthur H. Dean, Corporate Reorganization, 26
CORNELL L. Q. 537, 538 (1941).
43
For an analysis of intercreditor agreements and proposals for policing them, see Skeel, et al.,
Bankruptcy on the Side, supra note 22, at 258, 261.
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Post-petition contracting also figures much more prominently than in the
past. This is in part due to several underappreciated features of the 1978 Code
itself. Unlike the earlier Bankruptcy Act, which constrained the scope of ex post
contracting, the Code encourages the parties to renegotiate their entitlements
through features such as the voting rules, which make the terms of a restructuring
binding if the specified majority of a class approves, and the ability to wave off
the absolute priority rule for any class that approves. 44
Current bankruptcy law also has a second distinctive feature in this regard:
it converts many stakeholders who did not have prebankruptcy contracts with
the debtor into what are, in effect, contract creditors. 45 Tort victims, for instance,
are given unsecured claims, which can be renegotiated in the same fashion as
prebankruptcy contracts. Under prior bankruptcy law, many of these claims
would not have been “provable,” and as a result would not have been part of the
bankruptcy case. 46 Nearly every pre-petition obligation against the debtor
becomes a contract claim in bankruptcy.
More recently, another form of ex-post contracting has emerged. The parties
in most large-scale reorganizations now enter into restructuring support
agreements (RSAs) or plan support agreements (PSAs). 47 (Although the terms
are sometimes used interchangeably, agreements negotiated prior to the
bankruptcy filing are usually called RSAs and those that first emerge during the
bankruptcy case PSAs). RSAs and PSAs are designed to bind the signatories to
the terms of an anticipated reorganization plan. This can be particularly
important if the debtor’s claims are actively traded. In addition to imposing
deadlines for confirmation of a reorganization plan and other key steps in the
bankruptcy process, these contracts require each signatory to ensure that any
purchaser of its claims will also be bound. 48
Much more than the new ex-ante contracts, the new ex-post bankruptcy
contracts are subject to the unwritten rules Professor Baird has identified. RSAs
and PSAs often include fees that are designed to compensate signatories for their
See Skeel & Triantis, supra note 41, at 1799–800.
11 U.S.C. § 101(5) (2019) (defining “claim” expansively, as any “right to payment, whether or not
such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed,
undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured . . . .”).
46
See, e.g., Stephen Allen Edwards, Note, Tort Claims Under the Present and Proposed Bankruptcy Acts,
11 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 417, 418–24 (1978) (discussing the limits of “provability” for tort claims).
47
See, e.g., Edward Janger & Adam J. Levitin, Badges of Opportunism: Principles for Policing
Restructuring Support Agreements, 13 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 169 (2019); Douglas G. Baird,
Bankruptcy’s Quiet Revolution, 91 AM. BANKR. L.J. 593 (2017).
48
See, e.g., David A. Skeel, Jr., Distorted Choice in Corporate Bankruptcy, YALE L.J. (forthcoming
2020).
44
45
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role in negotiating a potential plan and to induce other signatories to sign.49 The
terms of the fees seem to reflect the leading bankruptcy professionals’
understanding of the line between acceptable fees and illegitimate vote buying.
There are points of friction between both (ex-ante) intercreditor agreements
and (ex-post) RSAs, on the one hand, and key provisions of the Code, on the
other. Some intercreditor agreements appear to interfere with bankruptcy’s
voting rules, for instance, by assigning junior lienholders’ voting rights to the
senior lienholders or forbidding junior lienholders from challenging a plan
supported by the seniors. 50 By committing signatories to vote in favor of an
anticipated plan, RSAs and PSAs seem to violate the requirement that a
disclosure statement be distributed before the debtor solicits votes. 51 Despite the
similarity of the frictions, bankruptcy judges have been much more deferential
to RSAs and other ex-post agreements than to ex-ante agreements. As noted
earlier, this may in part be because ex-post agreements are negotiated by other
bankruptcy insiders, in accordance with the insiders’ code of context. 52 In my
view, courts have been too hostile to ex-ante agreements and at times too
deferential to ex-post agreements, with potentially detrimental effects for the
efficiency of the large-scale reorganization process. 53
The Eighth Circuit’s recent Peabody Energy case is a good illustration. 54 A
central issue when Peabody Coal filed for bankruptcy was a dispute over the
scope of the senior lenders’ liens. At the request of the debtor, the issue was
submitted to mediation. Creditors who wished to participate in the mediation
were required to refrain from claims trading during the process. Rather than
simply resolving the lien dispute, the mediation led to a proposed reorganization
plan. The principal participants in the mediation would have an exclusive right
to participate in 22.5% of a private placement of preferred stock at a price 35%
below the stock’s expected value. 55 Any creditor could participate in the other
two slices of the placement, but only if they signed a PSA reflecting the terms
49

Id.
See Bank of Am. v. N. LaSalle St. Ltd. P’ship (In re 203 N. Lasalle St. P’ship.), 246 B.R. 325 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. 2000) (contractual provision assigning junior creditors’ votes to senior creditors).
51
See 11 U.S.C. § 1125 (2019).
52
See supra notes 21–22 and accompanying text.
53
Skeel & Triantis, supra note 41, at 1817. This does not mean there is no need to police intercreditor
agreements and other ex-ante contracts. There is. Courts should be mindful, for instance, of potential externality
effects on other creditors. Skeel, et al., Bankruptcy on the Side, supra note 22. But this does not require courts
to ignore the contracts altogether or interpret them in highly uncharitable fashion.
54
Ad Hoc Comm. of Non-Consenting Creditors v. Peabody Energy Corp. (In re Peabody Energy Corp.),
933 F.3d 918 (8th Cir. 2019). For a more extensive discussion of the case, see Skeel, Distorted Choice, supra
note 48.
55
In re Peabody Energy Corp., 933 F.3d at 922.
50
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of the proposed plan within 3 days for the second (5%) slice and within 30 days
for the third (72.5%) slice. 56
Although the terms of the private placement were deeply problematic, it was
approved by the courts. The arrangement could perhaps be critiqued under
bankruptcy’s unwritten rules. If the entrance requirements for participating in
the mediation were too onerous, the reasoning might go, the unwritten rule
guaranteeing everyone a “seat at the table” was violated and the private
placement should have been disallowed. 57 But this approach seems quite
indirect. The real question is not whether everyone had an opportunity to
participate; it is whether the contract should be enforceable as written, or
whether its terms are problematic. This is the approach courts apply in corporate
law and it seems to me the approach courts should apply here. 58 The more
general point is that, while bankruptcy’s unwritten rules are important, the
central issue in current reorganization practice is managing the tradeoffs
between ex-ante and ex-post contracting.
CONCLUSION
This Essay is the latest in a long line of path-breaking Douglas Baird
writings. He has discovered a feature of the evolution of large-scale organization
that other scholars were vaguely aware of, but whose importance no one had
fully recognized. In this commentary, I have simply endeavored to put Professor
Baird’s insights into a larger context, by offering reminders that an insideroriented system has downsides as well as benefits, and that the written law of
bankruptcy still matters a great deal.

56

Id.
As Professor Baird posited in an email discussion among the participants on the panel for which this
commentary was written. Email from Douglas G. Baird, Professor, The University of Chicago Law School, to
author (Feb. 17, 2020, 4:46 p.m.) (on file with author). In my view, the requirement that mediation participants
refrain from trading should not be viewed as an excessively onerous obligation, but I acknowledge this is
debatable.
58
In Paramount Commc’ns., Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 828 (Del. 1993), for instance, the
Delaware Supreme Court invalidated a lockup agreement, deeming its terms excessively generous to the bidder
and likely to interfere with alternative bids for the target corporation.
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